Discharging Student Loans via Bankruptcy: Undue Hardship Doctrine in the First Circuit by Bowers, Anthony
University of Massachusetts Law Review
Volume 4
Issue 1 Trends and Issues in Bankruptcy Article 6
January 2009
Discharging Student Loans via Bankruptcy: Undue
Hardship Doctrine in the First Circuit
Anthony Bowers
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Education Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Massachusetts Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School
of Law.
Recommended Citation
Bowers, Anthony (2009) "Discharging Student Loans via Bankruptcy: Undue Hardship Doctrine in the First Circuit," University of












                                                
DISCHARGING STUDENT 
LOANS VIA BANKRUPTCY: 
UNDUE HARDSHIP DOCTRINE 






Student loans are presumptively non-dischargeable 
through bankruptcy, but the undue hardship doctrine provides 
an equitable “safety valve” for the indigent.1 To date, the 
United States First Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to select 
a single legal test for determining undue hardship under the 
United States Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”).2 
Within the jurisdiction of the First Circuit, bankruptcy courts 
are free to choose an approach to evaluate undue hardship.3 
In an effort to ensure consistency throughout the bankruptcy 
courts within the First Circuit, it would be ideal if the First 
Circuit would choose one of the undue hardship tests. 
However, until the First Circuit changes its position, the 
concept of undue hardship will be left open to judicial 
interpretation. This note explores the various undue hardship 
tests available to the First Circuit, and provides examples of 
how those tests have been applied by different courts. The 
two dominant tests in the First Circuit, the Brunner test and 
the Totality of the Circumstances test, will be explored in 
depth.  
 
 Candidate for J.D., 2010, Southern New England School of Law, 
North Dartmouth, Massachusetts. 
1 Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 330 B.R. 323, 324 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). 
2 See Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730, 735 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2006). 
3 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 312 B.R. 200, 206 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004).  
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) amended the Bankruptcy Code, 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The purpose of the amendment was, in 
part, to ensure the continued prevention of abuse by graduates 
attempting to discharge student loans “on the eve of a 
lucrative career.”4 Furthermore, the amendment sought to 
protect the solvency and perpetuity of student loan 
programs.5  
The Bankruptcy Code provides that a Chapter 7 debtor is 
entitled to discharge all debts which arose prior to filing a 
bankruptcy petition.6 This is a fundamental principle 
underlying the Bankruptcy Code, because it provides an 
honest debtor with a “fresh start”.7 A major exception to the 
“fresh start” concept is the undue hardship doctrine, which 
provides that most student loan debt is exempt from the 
general rule of discharge unless such debt “would impose an 
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.”8 
A student loan will not be discharged “[u]nless the debtor 
affirmatively secures a hardship determination.”9 An 
educational debt will not be discharged unless the debtor can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that repayment 
of the debt would impose an undue hardship on the debtor 
and the debtor’s dependants.10  
 
4 Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program Inc. (In re Andresen), 232 
B.R. 127, 130 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999). 
5 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. Corp. (In re 
Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
6 11 U.S.C. § 727(a), (b) (2009).  
7 Burkhead v. United States (In re Burkhead), 304 B.R. 560, 565 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (citing Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 
245 B.R. 731, 744 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000)). 
8 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2009). 
9 Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450 (2004). 
10 See Smith v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Smith), 328 B.R. 
605, 610–11 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005).  





                                                
The initial burden is on the creditor to prove that the debt 
exists and that it is the type of loan exempt from general 
Chapter 7 discharge. Once the creditor satisfies that 
requirement, the burden then shifts to the debtor to prove 
undue hardship.11 In addition to filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition, a debtor must also initiate an adversarial proceeding 
against their student loan creditors in order to attempt to 
discharge student loan debt.  
While undue hardship remains statutorily undefined as of 
the last revision of the Bankruptcy Code,12 several courts 
have formulated different tests to determine undue hardship. 
For example, there is the Bryant Poverty Level test,13 the 
Brunner test,14 the Totality of the Circumstances test,15 and 
the Johnson test.16 Neither the Bryant test nor the Johnson 
test have been used in the First Circuit, they are being 
highlighted merely to provide other schools of thought for 
determining undue hardship, and to provide a backdrop of the 
jurisprudential landscape. The Brunner test and the Totality 
of the Circumstances test dominate the First Circuit. “Most 
courts within the First Circuit have adopted the ‘totality of 
circumstances’ test. . . . Nevertheless, several courts within 
this circuit have applied the Brunner test.”17 The Bankruptcy 
Code does not provide for a particular test. As a result, the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit has held the 
bankruptcy courts are free to choose their own approach 
when analyzing undue hardship cases.18 
 
11 See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Savage (In re Savage), 311 B.R. 
835, 839 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004). 
12 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, 109 P.L. 8 § 220, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)). 
13 Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant),       
72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
14 Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 
831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). 
15 Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 
661 F.2d. 702 (8th Cir. 1981). 
16 Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson),     
5 B.C.D. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).  
17 Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730, 736 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2006). 
18 See id.  
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There is limited legislative history on undue hardship, but 
many courts have cited a 1973 Report of the Commission on 
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States when formulating 
or adopting a test: 
 
[Student loans] should not be dischargeable as 
a matter of policy before [the debtor] has 
demonstrated that for any reason he is unable 
to earn sufficient income to maintain himself 
and his dependents and to repay the 
educational debt. In order to determine 
whether nondischargeability of the debt will 
impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor, the 
rate and amount of his future resources should 
be estimated reasonably in terms of ability to 
obtain, retain and continue employment and 
the rate of pay that can be expected. Any 
unearned income or other wealth which the 
debtor can be expected to receive should also 
be taken into account. The total amount of 
income, its reliability, and the periodicity of its 
receipt should be adequate to maintain the 
debtor and his dependents at a minimal 
standard of living within their management 
capability, as well as to pay the educational 
debt.19 
 
The above quote provides the only legislative intent as to 
the original meaning of undue hardship. The analysis in the 
above quote is the starting point from which all of these tests 
are formulated. The undue hardship doctrine is an elusive 
standard. Courts have historically struggled to formulate tests 
for its application.20 Typically, student loans are exempt from 
 
19 Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18,    
25–26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (citing Communication from the Executive 
Director, Commission on the Bankruptcy laws of the United States, 
Transmitting a Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy laws of the 
United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. II, 140 
n.15, 140–41 n.17 (1973)). 
20 See In re Paul, 337 B.R. at 735. 





                                                
discharge; however, a finding of undue hardship will remove 
that exemption and allow the debtor to discharge the student 
loan debt along with other debt through bankruptcy. 
Unfortunately, this language is not always used in a 
consistent manner. 
 
II. THE TESTS 
 
A. The Bryant Poverty Level Test 
 
The Bryant Poverty Level test, from the Third Circuit, 
creates a rebuttable presumption of undue hardship. Under 
the Bryant test, if the debtor’s income is below the federal 
poverty level, then undue hardship exists and the student 
loans are discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. Conversely, 
if the debtor’s income is above the federal poverty level, the 
loans are presumed to remain exempt from discharge. The 
debtor or the creditor can rebut this presumption by offering 
evidence of extenuating circumstances. This test is an attempt 
by the Eastern District Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Pennsylvania to add some sort of objectivity to the undue 
hardship doctrine.21 It should be noted that this test has not 
gained widespread acceptance, and it has never been used in 
the First Circuit. 
 
B. The Johnson Test 
 
The Johnson test, also from the Third Circuit, considers a 
debtor’s salary, wages, skills, sex, employment history, 
current employment, education, health, transportation, 
 
21 See Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 
72 B.R. 913, 915–19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
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dependants, and other income.22 The bankruptcy court 
determines the debtor’s reasonable expenses while 
maintaining a minimal standard of living for the debtor and 
the debtor’s dependants.23 Next, the court analyzes if the 
income can support the debtor’s expenses and repayment of 
the loans.24 In addition, the Johnson test requires either a 
good faith test or a policy inquiry test to be applied. The good 
faith test requires the debtor to show a “bona fide attempt to 
repay the loan.”25 A bona fide attempt may include taking 
advantage of all employment opportunities, minimizing 
expenditures, and maximizing resources.26 The policy inquiry 
test requires the court to weigh the discharge against the 
policy behind 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). If the court “concludes 
either that the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy petition 
was to discharge the student loan debt or the debtor has 
definitely benefitted financially from the education which the 
loan helped to finance,” the loans will not be discharged.27 
Like the Bryant test, the Johnson test has not gained 
widespread acceptance, and it has never been used in the First 
Circuit. 
 
C. The Brunner Test 
 
The Brunner test, from the Second Circuit, is the most 
prevalent test used to determine undue hardship in a majority 
of the Circuits.28 The three prongs to the Brunner test are as 
follows: 
 
22 See Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 737 
(Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (citing Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. 
Johnson (In re Johnson), 5 B.C.D. 532, 536–39 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979)). 
23 See id. at 737 (citing In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 538). 
24 Id. at 737–38 (citing In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 544). 
25 Id. at 738 (citing In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 540 (citing A. Ahart, 
Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 207 
(Summer 1978))). 
26 See id. (citing In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 541–42, 544). 
27 Id. (citing In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 544). 
28 See, e.g., Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 
F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys (In re 





                                                                                                    
(1) The debtor cannot maintain, based on current 
income, a minimal standard of living for 
themselves and their dependants if forced to 
repay the loans; 
(2) Additional circumstances exist indicating that 
this state of affairs is likely to persist for a 
significant portion of the repayment period of 
the student loans; and 
(3) The debtor has made good faith efforts to 
repay the loans.29  
 
The debtor has the burden of proving each prong of the 
Brunner test30 by a preponderance of the evidence.31 
The first prong, also known as the “minimal standard” 
prong, requires a thorough examination of the debtor’s 
financial position. The debtor must prove that he or she 
cannot maintain a minimal standard of living and repay the 
loans. This is analyzed based on the debtor’s current income 
and reasonable expenses.32   
The second prong in the Brunner test, also known as the 
future prospects element, requires a showing of a likelihood 
that the debtor’s position is likely to persist. This test requires 
the courts to consider whether “additional circumstances exist 
indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a 
significant portion of the repayment period of the student 
 
Polleys), 356 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2005); Hemar Ins. Corp. v. Cox (In re 
Cox), 338 F. 3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2003); U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt 
(In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 2003); United Student Aid Funds, 
Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1998); Pa. Higher Educ. 
Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1995); Ill. 
Student Assistance Comm’n v. Roberson (In re Roberson), 999 F.2d 1132 
(7th Cir. 1993). 
29 Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 
831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987). 
30 See Lehman v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Lehman), 
226 B.R. 805, 808 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998). 
31 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).  
32 King v. Vt. Student Assistance Corp. (In re King), 368 B.R. 358, 
367 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007).  
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loans.”33 “These additional circumstances must be 
‘extraordinary and exceptional and generally indicate a 
hopelessness for the indefinite future as to any possibility of 
repayment.’”34 There is some debate as to whether this 
requires certainty of hopelessness. Many courts seem to be 
swayed by a probability that the debtor’s current 
circumstances will persist for a substantial amount of time.35 
Such circumstances where undue hardship has been found 
include debilitating or terminal illnesses, disabilities, or 
responsibility for an unusually large number of dependants.36 
The third prong of the Brunner test resembles the Johnson 
test by requiring a showing of good faith by the debtor. 37 It 
requires the debtor to make a good faith effort to repay the 
loans.38 This is measured by payments, and “efforts to obtain 
employment, maximize income, and minimize expenses.”39 
“In making this assessment, a court should examine the 
debtor’s standard of living, with a view toward ascertaining 
whether the debtor has attempted to minimize the expenses of 
[themselves] and [their] dependants.”40 The debtor has to 
 
33 Neal v. N.H. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Neal),         
354 B.R. 583, 589 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2006) (citing In re Brunner, 831 F.2d 
at 396). 
34 Id. (citing McClain v. Am. Student Assistance (In re McClain),  
272 B.R. 42, 48 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2002)). 
35 See In re King, 368 B.R. at 367–68. 
36 Santamassino v. N.J. Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth. (In re 
Santamassino), 373 B.R. 807 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007) (citing In re Thoms, 
257 B.R. 144, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)); In re King, 368 B.R. at   
370–71; Kelsey v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Kelsey), 287 
B.R. 132, 142, 144 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2001)). 
37 Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 738 
(Bankr. D. Me. 2000). 
38 Id. See also In re Neal, 354 B.R. at 590 (citing Brunner v. N.Y. 
State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d 
Cir. 1987)). 
39 King v. Vt. Student Assistance Corp. (In re King), 368 B.R. 358, 
373 (citing O’Hearn v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re O’Hearn),        
339 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
40 Burton v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Burton), 339 B.R. 856, 
870 (Bankr. E. D. Va. 2006) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Services v. Smitley (In re Smitley), 347 F.3d 109, 117 (4th Cir. 2003)).  





                                                
maximize his or her income potential and minimize expenses 
to only “reasonably necessary expenses.”41  
The circuits which have adopted the Brunner test, 
“maintain it provides a workable, easily articulated 
framework for courts and parties to follow while still 
allowing for a fact– and case-sensitive determination.”42 It is 
also praised as being a “simple[] rubric” that fosters certainty 
and predictability.43 The certain factors of the Brunner test 
provide consistent results.44 However, the test is highly 
criticized especially within the First and Eighth Circuits. 
“[R]equiring our bankruptcy courts to adhere to the strict 
parameters of a particular test would diminish the inherent 
discretion contained in [11 U.S.C.] § 523(a)(8)(B).”45 Courts 
adhering to the Totality of the Circumstances test claim it is 
too rigid and inflexible. “The more equitable judgment is 
hemmed in by rules, the less equitable it becomes.”46 Despite 
this criticism, the Brunner test remains the most used test 
throughout the jurisdictions.47 
The following cases are chosen to illustrate in which 
circumstances the courts within the First and Second Circuits 
have found undue hardship under the Brunner test.  
 
 
41 Smith v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Smith), 328 B.R. 605, 
613 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005). 
42 Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 25 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (citing Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re 
Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Polleys (In re Polleys), 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2005); U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); In 
re Faish, 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
43 In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 25. 
44 See id. 
45 Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 330 B.R. 323, 
325 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (citing Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In 
re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
46 Id. at 326. 
47 See In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 24–25. 
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1) Santamassino v. New Jersey  
         Student Assistance Authority48 
 
In 2006, Joan Santamassino, a plaintiff with student loan 
debt, initiated an adversarial proceeding to discharge over 
$16,000 in student loans. The note became due in 1986, and 
she made “sporadic payments.”49 The guarantor paid the note 
in 1988. From 1989 until 2003, the debtor made 107 
payments totaling $20,661. She did not make a payment after 
2003.50  
The plaintiff’s mother was diagnosed with Parkinson’s 
disease twenty-three years prior to this action. Upon her 
mother’s deterioration, the debtor quit her law practice in 
New Jersey to care for her. Santamassino and her husband 
relocated to Vermont to care for her mother who required 
twenty-four hour care. In 2001, the debtor and her husband, 
the sole earner for the household, divorced. As a result, the 
debtor was forced to live exclusively on her mother’s social 
security and pension benefits.51 
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont applied 
the Brunner test to Santamassino’s case, in order to determine 
if undue hardship existed. The court found the first prong of 
the Brunner test, the minimal standard requirement, was 
satisfied by the debtor, a decision which was not challenged 
by the creditor. The prong requires the debtor to show they 
cannot maintain a minimal standard of living and repay the 
student loans. The debtor’s mother’s social security and 
pension benefits totaled just over $3,100 per month, but their 
monthly expenses exceeded $3,500. The court deemed the 
expenses were reasonable, and held that the debtor could not 
maintain a minimal standard of living if she was required to 
repay the student loans.52  
 
48 Santamassino v. N.J. Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth. (In re 
Santamassino), 373 B.R. 807 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007). 
49 Id. at 810. 
50 See id.  
51 See id. at 812. 
52 See id. at 811. 





                                                
The court found the plaintiff had met the second prong of 
the Brunner test, the additional and exceptional 
circumstances requirement. This prong requires a showing 
that exceptional circumstances are present, prohibiting 
payment of the loan. It must also be shown the circumstances 
are likely to persist into the foreseeable future. The debtor 
devoted nearly all of her time to the long term care of her ill 
mother, including cooking, cleaning, shopping, providing 
personal care, helping with medications, driving her mother 
to appointments, paying her bills, and generally availing to 
the needs of her mother twenty-four hours a day.53 This time 
commitment made it impossible for the debtor to earn extra 
income. The doctor testified that the debtor’s mother’s 
condition is “chronic and progressive.”54 She is in the late 
stages of the disease and she is likely to live “several more 
years.”55 These circumstances were additional and 
exceptional, thus satisfying the second prong of the Brunner 
test.56  
Santamassino also satisfied the third prong of the Brunner 
test, the good faith requirement. The debtor repaid over half 
of the loan between 1983 and 2003. She made payments from 
1983 to 1986, then requested and received forbearance, but 
later resumed payments from late 1986 through 1988. 
Between 1989 and 2003, she made another 107 payments.57 
Although the debtor was unable to seek or maintain 
employment since 2000, she still made many payments, even 
selling personal property to do so. The court found that her 
efforts to maximize income and minimize expenses satisfied 
the third “good faith” prong of the Brunner test.58 The court 
also held that the debtor’s mother could be considered a 
dependent, and that the services she provided to her mother 
were invaluable. The court seemed reluctant to impute bad 
 
53 See id. at 812. 
54 Santamassino v. N.J. Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth. (In re 
Santamassino), 373 B.R. 807, 812 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007). 
55 Id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 812–13. 
58 See id. at 813. 
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faith on a person foregoing a career to benefit an ailing 
parent.  
The facts showed that the debtor satisfied the Brunner 
test. She could not maintain minimal living standards and 
repay the loans on just her mother’s pension. The twenty-four 
hour care she provided to her mother was exceptional and 
likely to persist. She exercised good faith by making many 
payments on the loans when able to do so. Consequently, the 
court found that the debtor was entitled to discharge her 
student loans to avoid imposing undue hardship on the 
debtor.59 
 
2) Markison v. Educational Credit Management Corp.60 
 
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont 
determined that the debtor, Lynda Markison, did not satisfy 
her burden of proving the three Brunner prongs.61 Markison 
had one dependant in high school, but the dependant lived 
with an adult sibling. The debtor earned a degree from 
Lyndon State College, Lyndonville, Vermont in 1994. At the 
time of her bankruptcy filing, the debtor’s income was 
$21,000, plus she received money for room, board, and travel 
expenses associated with her employment. The creditor, 
Educational Credit Management Corporation, held the 
debtor’s student loan note with a balance of $42,491 in 
February 2006, which accrued interest at a rate of 4.13% per 
year.62  
The court found that the debtor did not satisfy the first 
prong of the Brunner test, the minimum standard 
requirement. In applying the first prong, the court took into 
consideration that the debtor traveled extensively for her job, 
and all of her travel expenses were covered by her employer. 
 
59 See id. at 813–14. 
60 Markison v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Markison), 2007 WL 
1668777 (Bankr. D. Vt.). 
61 See id. at 1. 
62 See id at 2. 





                                                
Markison was employed about eighty percent of the year and 
averaged $1,171 in income per month. The court found her 
current monthly expenses to be $1,344, which was not 
enough to maintain a minimum standard of living if her 
expenses were reasonable.63 However, Markison spent $984 
per month on travel expenses, accounting for eighty percent 
of her income, in order to travel back to Vermont on the 
weekends.64 The court found her travel expenses 
unreasonable, since all of her expenses would be covered if 
she remained at her job location.65  
As a result of the court’s determination that the travel 
expenses were unreasonable, the court dismissed her claim. 
The reasoning was that if Markison had recalculated her 
budget and reduced her traveling expenses, she would have 
had ample resources to make payments on her student loans 
and maintain a minimal standard of living. An inability to 
travel at one’s discretion cannot be classified as an undue 
hardship.66 The court recognized the failure of one prong of 
the Brunner test should end the analysis, and the student loan 
debt should remain exempt from discharge.67 However, the 
court still chose to continue its analysis. 
The second prong requires additional and exceptional 
circumstances indicating the debtor’s inability to pay the 
loans will extend indefinitely into the future.68 In the 
stipulated facts at pre-trial, the debtor admitted that she did 
not suffer a disability. She had only one dependant who did 
not even live with her. She had a decent job with benefits, 
even though it may not have been ideal. In the thirteen years 
following her graduation, she continuously found 
employment. The debtor’s circumstances did not amount to 
additional and exceptional under the Brunner test. The court 
found the debtor’s condition was not likely to persist for the 
duration of the repayment period, and that she was able 
 
63 See id.  
64 See id. at 3. 
65 See id. at 4. 
66 See Markison v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Markison), 2007 
WL 1668777, 5 (Bankr. D. Vt.). 
67 See id.  
68 See id.  
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bodied, healthy, and could find better employment in the 
future. Consequently, the debtor did not meet her burden of 
proof; therefore, her student loans remained exempt from 
discharge.69 
Ultimately, if a debtor fails to meet one element of the 
Brunner test, the debtor’s student loans will remain exempt 
from discharge in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Vermont analyzed the debtor’s circumstances 
under prongs one and two of the Brunner test, but did not 
engage in a good faith discussion under the third prong. 
Nevertheless, the court found that the debtor was not entitled 
to a finding of undue hardship after failing both the first and 
second prongs. 
 
3) King v. Vermont Student Assistance Corp.70 
 
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont ruled 
that James King was entitled to a finding of undue hardship 
and a subsequent discharge of his student loans. King 
acquired loans to finance an undergraduate degree at 
Northeastern University in Boston and a graduate degree at 
Schiller University in Paris.71 As of January 2006, King had 
two notes totaling over $120,000, including interest and 
principal. He was eligible for an Income Contingent 
Repayment Plan (“ICRP”), which calculated payments of $0 
based on current income and marital status at the time of his 
filing of a bankruptcy petition.72 In his best year between 
graduating and filing for bankruptcy, King grossed $20,000 
and made payments on his student loans. He stopped working 
in 2003 and did not work again, although he applied for many 
jobs. He filed for bankruptcy in 2005.73 In May 2006, King 
 
69 See id. at 6. 
70 King v. Vt. Student Assistance Corp. (In re King), 368 B.R. 358 
(Bankr. D. Vt. 2007). 
71 See id. at 360. 
72 See id. at 361. 
73 See id. at 359. 





                                                
had a major mental breakdown accompanied by suicidal 
inclinations, resulting in his hospitalization for eight days.74  
King had a history of mental illness. He began seeing a 
psychiatrist in 2001, and then started in 2002 to see the 
mental health professional who testified at his trial, Dr. 
Catherine Hickey.75 Dr. Hickey testified as to King’s existing 
and past mental health. 76 The doctor’s initial diagnosis was 
that King suffered from major depression. The doctor treated 
him with medication, but his condition did not improve. Over 
time, Dr. Hickey observed “hypomanic episodes followed by 
a depressive episode,”77 so she upgraded her diagnosis to 
bipolar disorder. She could not with certainty claim his state 
would persist indefinitely, but opined it was a “lifelong 
disorder . . . King has had at least one; if not several 
hypomanic episodes, he is definitely at risk of having 
others.”78   
The court concluded that King’s condition, coupled with 
stress, made employment extremely difficult. Both King’s 
doctor and his mother’s testimony were compelling and 
credible. The court also determined that his mental health 
condition was likely to persist indefinitely into the future. 
One creditor conceded that King had made a good faith effort 
to repay his loans while he was employed.79 Education Credit 
Management Corp., another creditor, claimed the availability 
of an Income Contingent Repayment Plan made discharge of 
the loans unnecessary, because the note would be in 
abeyance, with payments of $0, until King found adequate 
employment. The court was not persuaded by this argument 
because the mentally and emotionally unstable debtor would 
still face enormous debt if he found a job.  
The court found King had satisfied all three prongs of the 
Brunner test, and ordered that his student loans be 
 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See King v. Vt. Student Assistance Corp. (In re King), 368 B.R. 
358, 363 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007). 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 See id. at 370–71. 
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discharged.80 King received only $631 per month in Social 
Security Disability benefits. This was inadequate to maintain 
a minimal standard of living and make payments on his 
student loans, satisfying the first prong.81 The court found 
that King’s mental condition was additional and exceptional 
and likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment 
period. This satisfied the second prong of Brunner.82 The 
third prong, requiring a good faith effort to repay the loans, 
was also satisfied. He attempted to repay the loans when he 
was employed. He “maximized his income, minimized his 
expenses, and made reasonable efforts to find a job when he 
was not employed.”83  
 
4) Neal v. New Hampshire Higher 
     Education Assistance Foundation84 
 
Peggy and Thomas Neal initiated an adversarial 
proceeding to discharge six individual Stafford student loans 
owed by Peggy Neal. The aggregate total of the loans was 
$22,570, and as of August 2006, $30,449 was due. The 
debtors originally filed a Chapter 13 petition and made 
regular, but sometimes late, payments to their trustee based 
on a court approved payment plan. Part of the plan was to pay 
creditors, including the New Hampshire Higher Education 
Assistance Foundation (NHHEAF), with a lump sum from a 
pending personal injury action. Unfortunately, the attorney 
retained to handle the debtors’ tort action failed to perform 
his duties and the case was dismissed. Subsequently, the 
debtors revised their bankruptcy filing to a Chapter 7 
petition.85  
 
80 See id. at 373–74. 
81 See id. at 367. 
82 See King v. Vt. Student Assistance Corp. (In re King), 368 B.R. 
358, 373 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007). 
83 Id. 
84 Neal v. N.H. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Neal), 354 
B.R. 583 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2006). 
85 See id. at 586. 





                                                
Peggy Neal was a forty-seven year old woman who was 
employed in the automotive industry for twelve years. From 
1996 to 1999, she was enrolled as a part time student at New 
Hampshire Technical College, during which time she 
accumulated student loans to pay for the tuition. Mrs. Neal’s 
intention was to study computers to become more marketable 
and to increase her earning potential.86 In 2003, Mrs. Neal 
lost her job, but was able to find new employment performing 
data entry for $10.00 per hour. At one point, she was working 
a combined seventy-five hours per week as a bus driver and 
as a Wal-Mart cashier. She eventually quit driving a bus to 
have more time to care for her ailing husband, but she 
continued to work thirty-two hours per week at Wal-Mart 
because the job provided health benefits.87  
Thomas Neal was granted a discharge of his student loans 
by the Department of Education after a finding in 2005 that 
he was disabled. While the Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of New Hampshire was only analyzing Peggy Neal’s student 
loans under the undue hardship doctrine, Mr. Neal’s failing 
health was pertinent to the court’s analysis. Mr. Neal was 
diabetic, obese, suffered from depression, as well as chronic 
back pain from an injury. That back injury was the basis of 
the failed personal injury action mentioned above. Mr. Neal 
was unable to stand for any significant period, and required 
assistance from Mrs. Neal to dress, shower, and cook.88  
Peggy Neal earned $1,050 per month while Thomas Neal 
drew $872 in disability, resulting in a combined monthly 
income of $1,922. Their monthly expenses at the time of trial 
were $2,714 and apparently modest. Peggy Neal’s student 
loans were due January 2000. She requested and received a 
no pay forbearance. She never made a payment on her 
loans.89  
 
86 See id.  
87 See id.  
88 See id. at 587. 
89 See id. at 588. 
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The court applied the Brunner test for undue hardship to 
the Neals’ case. The first prong, the minimal standard of 
living requirement, requires debtors to maximize income and 
minimize expenses and still be unable to make payments on 
their student loans. The Neals’ satisfied this prong of the test. 
The court determined that the Neals’ spending was very 
frugal. The only expense of contention was a $97 cable bill, 
which was found to be reasonable in light of Mr. Neal’s 
disabled condition. The court also found that Mrs. Neal only 
working one job was reasonable in light of her caretaker 
status. She was working full time at a fair wage. The court 
seemed to indicate that a debtor who seeks undue hardship 
must work full time if able to do so. The first prong was 
satisfied by the Neals’ frugal expenses and Mrs. Neal’s full 
time job.90   
The second prong of the Brunner test considers whether 
additional circumstances exist, which make payment unlikely 
for a significant portion of the repayment period.91 Since Mr. 
Neal was disabled, he was on a fixed income, which was not 
likely to increase. Mrs. Neal, although working full time, 
could only work limited hours in order to provide the care her 
husband required. “Mr. Neal’s health is an extraordinary 
circumstance that limits both himself and Mrs. Neal.”92 The 
debtors satisfied the second Brunner prong because of Mr. 
Neal’s health, and the care he required from Mrs. Neal.93  
The third good faith prong of the Brunner test was also 
satisfied. This requires the debtors to “make monthly 
payments and/or attempting to negotiate an alternative 
payment plan with the lender.”94 Peggy Neal applied for a no 
pay forbearance, which was granted. At the time of the Neals’ 
bankruptcy filing, Mrs. Neal’s loans were deemed technically 
current. The debtors made regular payments to their Chapter 
13 trustee for four years under the assumption NHHEAF was 
participating as a creditor in the proceeding. The debtors also 
 
90 See Neal v. N.H. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Neal), 354 
B.R. 583, 588–89 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2006). 
91 See id. at 589. 
92 Id. at 590. 
93 See id. 
94 Id.  





                                                
proposed paying the note along with other debts from the 
proceeds of their pending personal injury action. Through no 
fault of their own, the debtors’ personal injury suit was 
dismissed. The debtors did not exercise bad faith, therefore, 
they satisfied the third element of the Brunner test entitling 
them to discharge Mrs. Neal’s student loans.95  
 
D. The Totality of the Circumstances Test 
 
The Totality of the Circumstances test is the most popular 
test in the First Circuit.96 The Eighth Circuit has also 
expressly adopted the test.97 In the First Circuit, in the 
absence of controlling authority, bankruptcy courts are free to 
choose an approach to evaluate undue hardship.98 Most 
courts within the First Circuit apply the Totality of the 
Circumstances test.99 The Totality of the Circumstances test 
reviews all relevant factors and circumstances surrounding a 
particular bankruptcy case. The factors include a debtor’s 
past, present and reasonably reliable future financial 
resources, as well as reasonably necessary living expenses.100 
It is also essential to consider all of the factors relevant to 
whether a debtor can maintain himself and his dependants 
now and into the reasonably foreseeable future, while 
continuing to repay his educational debt.101 
 
95 See id. 
96 See Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730, 735–36 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2006). 
97 See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 
554 (8th Cir. 2003). 
98 See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 312 B.R. 200, 
206 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2004).  
99 See In re Paul, 337 B.R. at 736.  
100 See Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 738, 
745–46 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000). 
101 See Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 
31 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). 
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The Totality of the Circumstances test analysis, reduced 
to elements, requires a debtor to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence the following:  
 
1) The debtor’s past, present, and reasonably 
reliable future financial resources; 
2) The debtor’s and all dependants’ 
reasonably necessary living expenses; and 
3) All other relevant facts or circumstances 
unique to the debtor’s case that prevent the 
debtor from paying the student loans in 
question, while still maintaining a minimal 
standard of living.102 
 
In Hicks v. Educational Credit Management Corp.,103 
Judge Henry J. Boroff eloquently reduces the Totality of the 
Circumstances test to “one simple question: Can the debtor 
now, and in the foreseeable future, maintain a reasonable, 
minimal standard of living for the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependants and still afford to make payments on the debtor’s 
student loans?”104 The courts should consider all relevant 
factors, including a debtor’s income, expenses, health, age, 
education, number of dependants, personal and family 
circumstances, monthly payments required to service student 
loans, effect of bankruptcy discharge of other debt, prospects 
for increased income, and ability to minimize expenses, and 
any other relevant factors.105 Many courts condense the 
elements of the test into the one simple question, list all of the 
relevant facts, and conclude whether a finding of undue 
hardship is warranted.   
 
102 Lorenz v. American Education Services et al. (In re Lorenz), 337 
B.R. 423, 430–31 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (citing In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 
31; In re Kopf at 739). 
103 In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 31. 
104 In re Lorenz, 337 B.R. at 430–31 (citing In re Hicks at 31; In re 
Kopf, 245 B.R. at 739). 
105 See Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730, 736 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2006). 





                                                
The Totality of the Circumstances test is praised for its 
flexible and meticulous fact specific approach. Proponents 
speculate that Congress’ choice to use a broad phrase such as 
undue hardship was intentional. The statute is devoid of any 
definition or explanation of the term and does not mandate a 
particular test.106 In doing so, Congress gave bankruptcy 
judges the authority and responsibility to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether the debtor is entitled to a finding of undue 
hardship.107 It is “simply an adjuration to the decision maker 
to make an honest and intelligent judgment after having given 
due consideration to all the information the parties        
provide . . . .”108 The test is criticized by courts adhering to 
Brunner as undermining consistency, predictability, and 
fairness by allowing too much judicial discretion. This 
criticism is countered by the fact that lenity is not always the 
result of flexibility; a judge may make a sound discretionary 
decision with the aid of all the facts pertinent to the case.109  
The following cases provide examples of how courts 
within the First Circuit have applied the Totality of the 
Circumstances test for undue hardship. 
 
1) Brunell v. Citibank110 
 
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts in 
Brunell held that the forty-one year old debtor, Jennifer Gail 
Brunell, who was employed in the health care industry, was 
not entitled to a finding of undue hardship.111 The debtor 
lived in Rhode Island, was divorced, and had custody of her 
 
106 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2009). 
107 See Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 330 B.R. 
323, 326 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). 
108 Id. See also Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 
F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003). 
109 See id. 
110 Brunell v. Citibank (In re Brunell), 356 B.R. 567 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2006). 
111 See id. at 569.  
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three young children.112 In September 2006, the debtor owed 
in excess of $200,000, which would require payments of 
almost $1,300 per month for thirty years to repay.113 The 
debtor qualified for an Income Contingent Repayment Plan 
(ICR). Based on her reported income, the debtor’s payment 
would have been $153 per month in 2005 and $260 per 
month in 2006.114   
The debtor’s educational history from which the loans 
arise is substantial. In 1987, she obtained a bachelor’s degree 
in electrical engineering from Worcester Polytechnic 
Institute.115 She earned a master’s degree in psychology from 
Lesley College in 1995.116 She attended a Ph.D. program at 
Suffolk University from 1996 until she dropped out in 2001, 
due to her being pregnant with twins.117 The debtor then 
sought to change her career to the medical profession while 
being supported by her husband. However, she separated 
from her husband of seventeen years in 2003, and divorced in 
2005.118 
The debtor’s work history was continuous. From 2004 to 
the time of the suit, the debtor maintained employment in the 
mental health field. She worked at the Attleboro Community 
Care Center, South Bay Mental Health Services, and at time 
of trial at the Early Intervention Program in Taunton where 
she earned $17.50 per hour plus mileage and gas 
reimbursement.119 To increase her earning potential, the 
debtor needed to obtain a state license, which required further 
training and an exam. In addition to the debtor’s salary, she 
also received $704 per month in child support, plus a 
 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. at 574–75 (This court refers to an Income Contingent 
Repayment Plan as an ICR, compared to an ICRP supra p. 13).  
115 See id. at 569. 
116 See Brunell v. Citibank (In re Brunell), 356 B.R. 567, 570 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2006). 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. at 570–71. 





                                                
percentage of any bonuses or commissions her ex-spouse 
may receive.120  
A thorough examination of her expenditures was not 
challenged as unreasonable.121 The court found the debtor 
had approximately $190 in disposable income. Brunell’s 
expenses had fluctuated to smaller amounts in the past 
year.122 Based on projected income and ICR payments, the 
debtor was only required to cut her budget by $70–$110 per 
month to make her student loan payments.123  
The debtor failed to establish that the continued payment 
of her student loans would constitute an undue hardship.124 
The debtor was found to be bright and very well educated. 
Her prospects for better and higher paying employment were 
good. She was in good health. She would only be required to 
reduce her expenditures modestly to maintain a minimal 
standard of living for herself and her dependants in order to 
make payments on her educational debt.  
 
2) Dufrense v. New Hampshire Higher 
             Education Assistance Foundation125 
 
The debtor in this case was a law school graduate who 
failed the bar nine times. The court found she met her burden 
of proof, and thus was entitled to a finding of undue hardship. 
She graduated from her undergraduate studies in 1994 and 
from law school in 1997.126 The balance of her student loans 
was over $106,000. Dufrense’s most recent employment was 
as a legal assistant and a real estate paralegal. Her ability to 
work full time was seriously impaired by a degenerative back 
 
120 See id. at 571. 
121 See id. at 572–75.  
122 See Brunell v. Citibank (In re Brunell), 356 B.R. 567, 579 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2006). 
123 See id. at 579–80. 
124 See id.  
125 Dufrense v. N.H. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re 
Dufrense), 341 B.R. 391 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006). 
126 See id. at 393. 
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condition. Her condition required surgeries, including spinal 
fusion, and it was likely that she would require more 
surgeries in the future.127  
She was a forty-five year old divorcee with children who 
were not considered dependants. Her salary averaged $43,000 
in 2002 and 2003, but dropped dramatically to $12,000 in 
2004, a year in which she also received over $12,000 in 
disability.128 Her expenses at trial, after discharge of 
approximately $8,000 in Chapter 7 debts, were $1,780. Her 
income for 2005 included six months of full time 
employment at $2,800 per month and one month of 
temporary work at $1,280.129 She received no disability, 
retirement or public assistance since 2004. The best 
repayment plan she could procure was a twenty year term at 
an interest rate of 3.375%. This would amount to payments of 
$621 per month and forgiveness of any unpaid portions at the 
end of the term.130  
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts 
found that the exception of her student loans from discharge 
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor. Judge Robert 
Somma refused to adhere to any particular test because he did 
not have to in the First Circuit.131 He stated that his 
considerations in reaching his conclusion were: “debtor’s 
financial history and condition, her age, her marital status, her 
employment record and prospects, her family obligations, her 
resources actual and projected, her health and medical 
condition, her honest effort and good faith in addressing her 
debts, and all other factors and considerations presented in 
evidence . . . .”132 His analysis was very similar to a typical 
totality of the circumstances approach, although he refused to 
call it that. He used all relevant factors and considerations 
presented into evidence.133  
 
127 See id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. at 393–94. 
130 See id. at 394. 
131 See Dufrense v. N.H. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re 
Dufrense), 341 B.R. 391, 394 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006).  
132 Id. at 395. 
133 See id.  





                                                
The court held that the debtor’s income was already 
insufficient to cover her expenses. She lived modestly at a 
very minimal level. Her prospects for regular future 
employment were uncertain at best, and her back was almost 
certain to deteriorate and require more surgeries.134 Even if 
the loans were to remain in forbearance, the debtor would 
still be faced by mounting interest, stress from the debt, and a 
credit report with the massive debt reported. To burden a 
debtor who could barely work and afford modest living 
standards with a $621 per month student loan payment would 
impose an undue hardship.135   
 
3) Paul v. Suffolk University136 
 
The debtor in this case, Lunise Paul, did not prove that 
repayment of her school loans would impose an undue 
hardship on her and her dependants. The debtor received both 
a Bachelor’s degree in general studies and a Masters degree 
in Public Administration from Suffolk University in Boston. 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Suffolk University 
forgave $4,200 of the debtor’s loans, stipulating that the 
repayment would constitute an undue hardship on the 
debtor.137 Educational Credit Management Corporation 
(“ECMC”) held seven notes totaling $53,000, and took a 
contrary position. The debtor’s work history since graduation 
was at various data entry and health assistant positions 
ranging from ten to fifteen dollars per hour. From 2003 to the 
date of the trial, she worked as a home health coordinator.138 
 
134 See id.  
135 See id.  
136 Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2006). 
137 See id. at 731–32. 
138 See id. at 732. 
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The debtor was a thirty-four year old single mother. She 
had three children ranging from age three to ten. English was 
her second language.139 The two fathers of the debtor’s 
children provided no child support, and she claimed to know 
the whereabouts of only one of them.140 The debtor claimed 
that her childcare responsibilities and poor English language 
skills limited her ability to procure a higher paying job, both 
presently and in the foreseeable future. The debtor also 
claimed the standard of living for her and her three 
dependants were below minimal standards. She did not have 
health insurance. She had a twelve year old vehicle that was 
in disrepair. She also claimed an inability to afford 
recreational or cultural activities for her family.141  
The debtor’s expenses were modest. She did not own a 
VCR or DVD player, did not subscribe to cable, and did not 
own a computer. She shared an apartment with her parents 
and paid $1,000 rent while her parents paid all of the 
utilities.142 She received Women, Infants, and Children 
vouchers for the purchase of milk, cheese, juice, and peanut 
butter, but no other form of public assistance.143 She did, 
however, own a $25,000 certificate of deposit, which she had 
received in settlement from an action against an agent of 
ECMC’s predecessor in interest for alleged unfair debt 
collection and stay violations.144 She also qualified for an 
ICR. Based on her income, amount borrowed, and family 
size, her payments would be $188 per month for nineteen and 
a half years.145  
 
139 See id.  
140 See id at 733.  
141 See id. at 734. 
142 See Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730, 733 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2006). 
143 See id.  
144 See id. at 732, 737. 
145 See id. at 734 (This court also uses the acronym ICR for Income 
Contingent Repayment Plan, compared to an ICRP supra page157). 





                                                
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
applying the totality of the circumstances test, held that the 
debtor did not meet her burden of establishing undue 
hardship. The debtor’s student loans would, therefore, remain 
exempt from general bankruptcy discharge.146 The Court 
reasoned that the debtor had not used any of her $25,000 
dollar settlement to pay down her student loans. Each year 
she received a significant tax return. Her 2004 return was 
over $7,000, approximately $585 per month in extra income. 
The Court also found it unreasonable that a person with the 
debtor’s level of education could not search and acquire 
higher paying employment.147   
The debtor was also found to have failed to maximize her 
income by not seeking support from the fathers of her 
children. Massachusetts General Laws provide guidelines for 
support and enforcement of child support orders.148 Taking 
into account all of these factors, as well as the debtor’s 
refusal to consolidate her loans and take advantage of an ICR, 
the Court found she failed to establish that repayment of her 
student loans would constitute an undue hardship.149 
 
4) Gharavi v. United States  
 Department of Education150 
 
The debtor in this case, Minoo Gharavi, was granted a 
finding of undue hardship by the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, resulting in a partial discharge of 
most of her student loans. Only one loan remained exempt 
from discharge, which she would have to pay off. The debtor 
earned a Bachelor’s degree in architecture from Texas 
 
146 See id. at 737. 
147 See id.  
148 See Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730, 738 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2006).  
149 See id. at 738–39. 
150 Gharavi v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Gharavi), 335 B.R. 492 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2006). 
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Southern University in 1987.151 In 1993, she decided to 
return to school at New England College of Optometry to 
pursue a doctorate in optomology. She took a leave of 
absence during the 1995–96 school year because she 
developed optic neuritis. She withdrew again during the 
1996–97 school year after being diagnosed with Graves’ 
disease. She failed out of school in the fall of 1997 because 
the medication that she had to take to treat her condition 
affected her 152
She was able to find employment as an ophthalmic 
technician from 2002 until trial. Her wage at the time of trial 
was $19.75 per hour for about forty hours per week.153 In 
2002, she was also diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. There 
are many side effects from the medication to treat the disease, 
as well as from the disease itself. The most pertinent side 
effect is chronic fatigue. The balance of her student loans at 
trial was over $63,000, and she never made a payment.154 An 
analysis of Ms. Gharavi’s income and expenses revealed a 
surplus of $62. The most generous payment schedule offered 
by the defendants was $419 per month.155 
The court applied the Totality of the Circumstances test 
and held the debtor was entitled to a finding of undue 
hardship. Multiple sclerosis is a degenerative disease and the 
debtor’s medical condition was almost certain to deteriorate 
over time. She made a decent wage and her fatigue prevented 
her from being able to work a second job. The debtor also 
lived with her mother, who only drew social security benefits 
to supplement the household income.156 After reviewing the 
evidence, the court held that the debtor’s circumstances 
warranted undue hardship and a partial discharge. All but one 
of the debtor’s student loans were discharged.157  
 
151 See id. at 494. 
152 See id. at 495. 
153 See id. at 495–96. 
154 See id. at 496. 
155 See id. at 501. 
156 See Gharavi v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Gharavi), 335 B.R. 492, 
499 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006). 
157 See id. at 501. 





                                                
The most notable aspect of this case was the court’s 
assessment of the monthly household expenditures on 
cigarettes by the debtor and her mother. The two smoked a 
combined thirty five packs a month, amounting to a total 
household expense of $175 per month on tobacco. After a 
lengthy discussion and citing significant authority, the Court 
found that this monthly tobacco expenditure was 
reasonable.158  
 
III.   CONCLUSION 
 
The fact undue hardship is a lofty standard gets lost in the 
debate over which test is the most appropriate template in 
which to gauge undue hardship. Congress has erected a high 
hurdle to debtors seeking to discharge student loan 
obligations. The line seems to be drawn somewhere higher 
than mere inability to pay and a little less than certain 
hopelessness. “Hardship alleged . . . must be undue and 
attributable to truly exceptional circumstances, such as illness 
or the existence of an unusually large number of 
dependents.”159 “Financial adversity alone is insufficient to 
warrant a student loan discharge on the basis of undue 
hardship.”160 No matter which test is employed, the debtor’s 
circumstances must be dire and bleak. 
The issue of which test will be applied is going to vary by 
district and judge until a case comes down with binding 
precedent. Until there is such a binding precedent, plaintiffs 
must be prepared to argue either the Totality of the 
Circumstances test or the Brunner test in the First Circuit. 
While the tests are similar in the evidence required to 
overcome the plaintiff’s burden, they still differ. The most 
notable divergence is the Brunner test’s good faith 
 
158 See id. at 498–500. 
159 TI Federal Credit Union v. Delbonis, 72 F.3d. 921, 927 (1st Cir. 
1995). 
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requirement. While it is not required in a totality analysis, it 
is a relevant factor and may be part of the analysis. It is an 
essential element of a prima facie case in a Brunner 
jurisdiction, and failure to prove good faith by a 
preponderance of the evidence is failure to acquire a finding 
of undue hardship.  
 
 
